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Abstract. The capability approach has been made operable and an example is the Human 
Development Index and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (Dotter & Klasen, 2014). 
However, its operable nature in the field of evaluation of specific dimension such as 
education, gender and poverty from a diffuse perspective is even broader (Addabbo, Di 
Tommaso & Facchinetti, 2004; Martinetti, 2006; Addabbo & Facchinetti, 2013). In this 
sense, this article aims to provide a very brief formal aproximation to the capability 
approach, mainly focusing on some their fundamental concepts.  
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1. Introduction 
t present the capability approach (Henceforth CA) is attracting of attention 
from scientists and researchers of the human and social sciences (see Note 
1 at the end). The reason for this lies on the importance of this approach not 
only as an assessment framework but as an ‘easily’ operable and flexible tool 
where the construction of the Human Development Index (HDI) and 
Multidimensional Poverty (MPI) stand out which offer greater objectivity for the 
measurement of people’s life quality (see Note 2 at the end) 
The motto of capability approach  is translated in that the welfare  is evaluated 
better in terms of "capabilities", that is to say, what people want to be or do to 
function and that it includes what these have reasons to value. In this sense, 
"capability" means freedom or more specifically, real opportunity to be and to do 
what is valued for each one and that consequently, this is what allows to 
functioning correctly (Robeyns, 2003). 
On the other hand the CA on having taken as a center the real and effective 
opportunity of people, appliesa differential approach, in other words, 
heterogeneous, where the pregnant woman's not the same as the one who is not it, 
or a person who fasts than which person's obligated to endure hunger, or that one 
whom the context favors of that one that this one restricts. These are the reasons 
why capability approach provides a base informacional wider than that one centred 
on primary goods or in the resources. 
Similarly for some authors like Ingrid Robeyns this approach does not explain 
social phenomena like poverty, the inequality and the exclusion; but rather, it is 
purposed to conceptualize these phenomena (e.g. see Robeyns, 2005; 2016). Which 
means, the approach allows the individual assessment and the social advantage 
analysis. In this sense Sen (2011) sustains that the CA can make a meaningful 
contribution to the justice theories: because justice is fosters when people enjoys of 
more freedoms to live a life which has reasons to value. 
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It should be noted that, some aspects of the capability approach, go back, 
between others, to Aristotle, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx 
(Robeyns, 2003; Clark, 2005; Alkire, 2010).  
Additional, this approach there is been extended thanks to the contributions of 
several authors, where Martha Nussbaum stands out, not only for offering a 
proposal centred on justice, but also about feelings (see Nusssbaum, 1992; 2002; 
2004). In contrast to Sen who proposes an approaching with major interests and 
applications in topics of poverty and inequality (e.g. see Sen, 1981) see Note 3 at 
the end. 
 
2. Capability as positive freedom 
The capabilities approach is closely related to the concept of positive freedom 
(Robeyns, 2011; Deneulin & Shahani, 2009), that is, that type of freedom centered 
on the opportunities to choose life that is valued with justified reasons, in this sense 
it distances itself from other approaches more «or entirely» centered on the 
negative freedom ”liberty:see Note 4 at the end-.This distinction is important 
insofar as it departs from some proposals like those of authors like Nozick who 
propose a theory of law related to the negative concept of freedom (see Sen, 1988).   
For freedom in a positive sense, Sen understands, that a person's really capable 
of doing this or being that (Sen, 1989). In this respect he says: "If I did not have the 
possibility to walk freely in the park because i am handicapped this would go 
against my positive freedom" (Sen, 2003, p.37).  
However, it also says ‚freedom understood positively refers to what having 
everything into account, a person can actually fulfill. In other words, it is not so 
much a matter of discriminating whether [...] the inability of a person to achieve a 
certain objective is due to restrictions imposed by other individuals or by the 
government‛ (Sen, 2003, p.36).  
Taking into account that by the capability Sen (1993) understands a concept that 
informs better about the welfare and advantage of a person's, it can be seen that its 
emphasis is on proposing an approach where the difference between equal 
opportunity to be able able to choose is minimal and not necessarily null as in the 
case of transcendental institutionalism (Ege, Igersheim & Le Chapelain, 2016; see 
Pogge & Alvarez, 2010; Sen, 2011), since it is impossible to construct a state of 
affairs where a disabled  will have  freedom  in every sense in comparison to those 
who are not . However, the dimensions of the barriers can be reduced and even 
eliminated, reaching certain functionings (see, Nussbaum, 2009). Consequently, 
the limitations must be taken into account in the assessment of the standard of 
living. 
 
3. Formalization 
For Sen (1993) cability refers to a space of potential (capabilities) and actual 
choices (functioning). The former do not represent what is truly realized "selected" 
or concrete, but rathe they are the ones that allow one to compare one life to 
another (Alkire, 2005). The last, that is to the concrete and realized choice 
"achievement" is called functioning and can be represented by a vector of the form 
bi = fi (c (xi)). In this sense for Basu & López-Calva (2011) in the Sen's model f is 
in part a question of the choice of person i's. The individual chooses a function of 
utilization of the possible set, Fi «that is, fi∈ Fi» utilization function of i, by which 
they convert characteristics into functionings. 
It should be noted, however, that (1) due to certain factors - which are of a 
personal, social or environmental nature - a person could not have chosen fi, even 
though this "utilization function" was valuable to him (see, Deneulin, 2011) 'let's 
call it fi', therefore, (2) being able to reach bi is subject (Robeyns, 2000) to 
achieved fi, but to achieved fi isn´t only a matter of the choice of person i's, rather 
is a matter of being able to choose the function taking into account such factors, 
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which is why the space of goods are restricted to those over which people have the 
capability that allow them to access their characteristics "let's call it Xi". 
More concretely, if xi = vector of commodities of person i's. Following to 
Gorman and Lancaster, Sen proposes: c (“) = the function not necessarily linear 
(Sen, 1996; Harsanyi, 1996) that converts a property vector into a feature vector y, 
fi (“) = a function of Xi) that taking into account the internal and external factors zk 
that person i's we obtain a functioning of the form bi = fi (c (xi)), which 
consequently reflects what I can achieved-to be or actually do. 
Now, note that given xi and more specifically, given c (xi), can to apply f (“) 
over c (xi) to obtain a bi functioning that represents an advantage (see Note 5 at the 
end), that is, a can to choose fi. What by definition supposes to have counted on 
capability or freedom.In other words, functioning may be a direct or indirect 
requirement for capabilities (Gandjour, 2008). 
In short, the possession of commodities does not confer any well-being, if it 
cannot be used. For example, if a bicycle that could be used to achieved a bi 
functioning. 
The person in question is paraplegic: even if he possesses the commodities and 
consequently, all his attributes or characteristics, he could not choose fi ∈ Fi, that 
is, the personal use function that would allow it to be mobilized. 
Perhaps, it can choose a fi∈ Fi ,  eg use it as a model to draw it, however, this 
does not represent any functioning, since what interests us is to make use of its 
attributes as a means of transport (see Note 6 at the end)but since it is not fulfilled 
that fi = fi*, therefore, it is not true that fi  is therefore valuable for i (see Williams, 
2003), eg, a person i's At a disadvantage vis-a-vis another person i* who could 
choose fi* (obviously it is understood that for both i and i * the weighting or 
valuation of fi* is the same). In other words for Sen (1993), when the capability 
approach is applied to a person's advantage, what matters is to assess it in terms of 
its real capability to achieved valuable functioning as part of life 
Finally, if a Pi (xi) is defined as a set of possible functionings of person i’s, it 
can be expressed as: Pi (xi) = [bi | bi = fi (c (xi)), for ∀ fi∈ Fi]. Then, if the vector of 
commodities chosen  xi by the person is restricted to the set Xi - which it involves to 
map c (xi) to fi to obtain from there to bi- then this set represents his rights and 
consequently, Qi(Xi) = [bi|bi = fi(c(xi)), ∀ fi(“) ∈ Fi y xi∈ Xi y zp, zs, zc ] the freedom 
or capability. 
 
Notes 
Note 1. The capability approach is a proposal that without being parallel to the utilitarianism, yes it is 
the one that more takes distance of this one. Essentially, and from an economic point of view, this 
approach recognizes and warns the importance of ethics. 
Note 2. Both indexes allow countries to track the reality of their development. Therefore, the per 
capita gross domestic product is useful in the assessment of the economic growth, but very inefficient 
as a Human Development’s metric: this affirmation does not suggest discarding the importance of 
income in people’s quality of life, but rather, to confirm that this is just a medium and not the end. 
Note 3. Nussbaum’s affirms that the main topic of Sen’s is the quality of life, while she is the search 
for the social justice and democracy in a liberal framework. 
Note 4. Sen is interested in negative freedom in a sense that goes beyond the restrictive perspective 
"as is the case of Nozick", because, transcending this concept as it says, you can help others when 
their rights are threatened. For example, the right not to suffer hunger 
Note 5. In this case who can apply f (“) against who cannot do 
Note 6. This consideration arises inasmuch as one might object that such commodities has other 
attributes than to serve as a means of transport. However, it is hardly plausible to suppose that these 
are merely attributes that even though they are there are irrelevant "save certain particular cases". For 
example, Sen warns that the utilitarian could assign some value, simply because someone can enjoy 
only the presence of this commodities, or because he likes its color. 
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